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THE 20TH ANNUAL CHARLES W. FROESSEL
INTRAMURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
BEST PETITIONER'S BRIEF
Lisa Aljian & David P. Crandall
A Note on the Format
The Best Petitioner's Brief is a reproduction of the brief that was
originally submitted for the Froessel Competition. Although the brief
is printed in its entirety, minor formatting changes have been required
for publication purposes.
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No. 1269/96
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
September Term, 1996
WILLAMINA WALLACE and MURRON MCGREGOR
Petitioners,
-against-
THE STATE OF FROESSEL
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, should this Court reverse the decision of the Thirteenth
Circuit, which applied the rational basis standard of review instead of
intermediate scrutiny, when analyzing the constitutionality of Froessel
Marriage Statute 186.5, given that: (1) The statute prohibits same sex
couples from obtaining a marriage license; (2) Dr. Wallace and Ms
McGregor were refused a marriage license because they were both
women; and (3) Dr. Wallace and Ms McGregor never alleged that they
were homosexual?
II. Under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
should this Court reverse the decision of the Thirteenth Circuit, which
held that Ms. McGregor's liberty interest in hastening her death did not
outweigh the state of Froessel's interests, given that: (1) Ms. McGregor
was competent to make the decision to hasten her death; (2) Ms.
McGregor is in the final stages of a painful terminal illness; (3) This
Court has already recognized a due process right in refusal of life
sustaining treatment?
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OPINIONS BELOW
The United States District Court, District of Froessel, held that
FMS § 186.5 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and granted declaratory and injunctive relief ordering
Froessel to grant a marriage license to Plaintiffs. Additionally, the court
found that FPL § 167.20 and FPL § 514.71 violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and granted declaratory and
injunctive relief. Its decision is reported at 912 F. Supp. 2d I (D. Froe.
1996).
The state of Froessel appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit, which reversed the district court's
decision on both issues. Its decision is reported at 49 F.3d 53 (13th Cir.
1996).
Dr. Willamina Wallace and Ms. Murron McGregor petitioned
the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. This
Court granted the petition.
792 [Vol. XIII
BEST PETITIONER'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners Dr. Willamina Wallace and Ms. Murron McGregor
met in 1979 at the Gay and Lesbian Pride Parade held in the state of
Froessel. (R. at 2.) They decided shortly thereafter to live together and
build a life in Froessel. (R. at 2.) Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor never
experienced any prejudice in their respective workplaces or in the
community. (R. at 2.) In 1991, Ms. McGregor began working for the
Housing Department of the State of Froessel, which provided
"exceptional" benefits to its employees. (R. at 2.) The only way Dr.
Wallace can be a beneficiary of these benefits is if they are legally
married. (R. at 3.) In 1993, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor wanted to
legally formalize their relationship so that they could enjoy the benefits
of marriage, including "naming each other as the beneficiaries of each
other's estate and insurance policies." (R. at 2.)
The clerk at the Froessel Department of Health denied Dr.
Wallace and Ms. McGregor a marriage license because they were of the
same sex. (R. at 3.) The Froessel Marriage Statute § 186.5 ("FMS")
provides as follows: A marriage is valid only if it is solemnized and
registered, between an unmarried male and an unmarried female, both
of whom are at least 18 years of age and not otherwise disqualified. (R.
at 3.) The clerk also stated that she could "give marriage licenses only
to heterosexual couples." (R. at 2.) Dr. Wallace, in a desperate attempt
to obtain a license, told the clerk that they were not a "homosexual
couple, but a same-sex couple." (R. at 3). The clerk still denied their
marriage license. (R. at 3.)
On October 5th, 1994, after complaining of feeling ill, Ms.
McGregor underwent several tests by her long time general practitioner
Dr. Edward Longshanks. (R. at 3.) She was diagnosed with
metastasizing lymphoma, a rare and fatal form of cancer. (R. at 3-4.)
Upon learning of Ms. McGregor's condition, Dr. Wallace was stunned
and dismayed. (R. at 4.) Dr. Longshanks stated the following:
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Dr. Longshanks: I am an oncologist, and therefore, I
have spent my life researching all types of cancer, but I
have specialized in the study of lymphomas for many
years. As I said in our first visit, this cancer is not very
common, but is fatal. Metastasizing lymphoma is a
rapid killer. You have already begun to experience
dizziness and headaches from the tumor pressing against
the base of your brain stem. As it grows, you will also
experience blackouts, motor and speech problems, and
debilitating headaches. As your cancer metastasizes,
tumors will grow on your lymph nodes, and cause pain
and swelling in the organ to which the cancer attaches.
Unfortunately, no treatment will slow the progression of
the disease, as it has already progressed into your
bloodstream. I promise to do all I can to ease the pain.
(R. at 4.)
Upon hearing this news, Dr. Wallace contacted Dr. Robert
Bruce, "a leading cancer specialist who has conducted extensive
research on lymphomas." (R. at 4.) In addition to confirming Dr.
Longshanks' prognosis, Dr. Bruce explained that research at the Smythe
Research Center was at least a year and a half from perfecting a cure for
lymphomas. (R. at 4 n. 12.)
A year after being diagnosed with metastasizing lymphoma, Ms.
McGregor entered the final phase of her disease and asked Dr. Wallace
to assist her in hastening her death. (R. at 4.) Since it was clear that Ms.
McGregor planned to end her life with or without physician assistance,
Dr. Wallace agreed. (R. at 4.) "Ms. McGregor also informed several
friends, Dr. Longshanks, and her beloved uncle Argyle that she wanted
to end her suffering." (R. at 4.) This desire did not surprise her close
friends, Dr. Wallace, or Ms. McGregor's uncle, since she had already
indicated her desire to be removed from life sustaining equipment in a
living will. (R. at 5). This will complies with Froessel Health &
Medicine Law § 80.383, which "permits competent adults, by a living
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will and powers of attorney, to elect in advance to reject life sustaining
medical treatment." (R. at 5 n. 13.)
Ms. McGregor and Dr. Wallace were aware of the Froessel
statutes prohibiting assisted suicide. (R. at 5.) The statutes read as
follows: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when
that person intentionally aids another person in committing suicide.
Violation of this provision is a class C felony. (R. at 5) (ci Froessel
Penal Law § 167.20). A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt
if that person intentionally aids a person to attempt suicide. Violating
this provision is a class E felony. (R. at 5) (ci Froessel Penal Law
§ 514.71).
In a written declaration, witnessed by her attorney and two
paralegals, which expressed her wish to hasten her death, Ms. McGregor
stated:
I am 37 years old and have always prided myself on
being a hard working and successful person. I love my
job as an architect for the state of Froessel, and it
saddened me deeply when I had to leave it as a result of
having cancer. Before becoming sick, I was very
athletic and independent. Now, unfortunately, I am
completely dependent on others, primarily, my beloved,
Willamina Wallace. My disease has progressed into the
final stage, and I am constantly in pain. I have tumors
ravaging my body which have caused extreme motor
problems, making the simplest task difficult. Although
I have been prescribed pain killers, they are basically
useless. I live every moment of every day in pain, and
I do not want to live like this any longer. I do not
believe I will ever get better, or that a cure will be found
before my death. Therefore, I want my long-time
partner and doctor, Willamina Wallace to assist me in
hastening my death. I have agreed on the arrangements,
and I am very comfortable with them. Willamina
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Wallace will write a prescription for Thonicane, which
I will then obtain and take a lethal dosage. I have
chosen this method because it is quick and painless.
These are my wishes.
(R. at 5.)
Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Froessel because they believe their
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process were
violated by Froessel's statutes on marriage and assisted suicide. (R. at
6.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Thirteenth Circuit, which held that the appropriate standard of
review for analyzing the constitutionality of Froessel Marriage Statute
("FMS") § 186.5 under the equal protection clause was the rational basis
standard. The appropriate standard of review is intermediate scrutiny.
Nonetheless, FMS cannot survive under either standard. FMS should be
reviewed under the intermediate standard of review because the statute
discriminates based on sex, which impairs equal rights of same sex
couples. FMS also violates equal protection ideals of fundamental
fairness and equality, which mandates that a higher standard of review
than a rational basis review be applied. FMS fails to satisfy intermediate
scrutiny because it does not prevent the spread of STD's or promote
procreation; therefore it is not substantially related to Froessel's stated
governmental goals. Alternatively, FMS 186.5 cannot survive a rational
basis standard of review because it is not rationally related to preventing
STD's or promoting procreation. Thus, the decision of the Thirteenth
Circuit should be reversed.
The State of Froessel's statutes which prohibit assistance in
hastening one's death are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
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due process clause as applied to Ms. McGregor because her liberty
interest in assistance with hastening her death outweighs the State of
Froessel's interest in preserving her life, preventing her suicide, and
avoiding the influence of third parties. Ms. McGregor has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining assistance with
hastening her death because it is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty and central to personal dignity and autonomy. Although Froessel
has legitimate interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, and
avoiding the influence of third parties, none of these interests is strong
enough to constitutionally prohibit Ms. McGregor's liberty interest in
assistance with hastening her death. Therefore, Froessel's prohibition of
assistance with hastening death is unconstitutional as applied to Ms.
McGregor because it violates her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
process.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DECISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH HELD THAT THE
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
FROESSEL MARRIAGE STATUTE 186.5 UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE WAS THE RATIONAL
BASIS STANDARD, BECAUSE THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD OF REVIEW IS INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY; NONETHELESS, THE FROESSEL
MARRIAGE STATUTE CANNOT SURVIVE UNDER
EITHER STANDARD.
The decision of the Thirteenth Circuit should be reversed
because the court applied the rationality standard of review, which is the
improper standard for this statute. Froessel Marriage Statute § 186.5("FMS") should be reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny standard
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because it discriminates based on sex. FMS cannot survive an
intermediate standard of review because it is not substantially related to
important governmental objectives. Alternatively, even if this Court
applies the rational basis standard, FMS could still not survive because
it is not rationally related to Froessel's stated objectives. Thus, the
decision of the Thirteenth Circuit should be reversed.
A. Froessel Marriage Statute 186.5 Should Be Reviewed
Under The Intermediate Standard Of Review
Because The Statute Discriminates Based on Sex.
Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for
FMS because it discriminates based on sex, which materially impairs the
rights of same sex couples. It violates the equal protection ideals of
fundamental fairness and equality, which mandate that a higher standard
of review than a rational basis standard be applied.
1. FMS discriminates based on sex, which
impairs equal rights of same sex couples;
thus, the intermediate standard is
appropriate.
Froessel Marriage Statute 186.5 ("FMS") discriminates based on
sex; it prohibits Dr. Willamina Wallace from marrying Ms. Murron
McGregor solely because they are of the same sex. Statutes that
discriminate based on sex require an intermediate scrutiny standard of
review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that laws
that establish classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those
objectives to be constitutional under equal protection clause). Here, the
plain language of FMS restricts legal marriages to opposite sex couples;
the statute, as applied, discriminates based on sex. The clerk denied Dr.
Wallace and Ms. McGregor a marriage license on the basis of their sex.
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(R. at 3.) If Dr. Wallace were a man, the marriage license would have
been granted. (See R. at 3.)
Although the statute applies equally to both male and female
same sex marriages, FMS does not escape an intermediate standard of
review. This Court held that mere "equal application" of a statute does
not protect it from a violation of equal protection. Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). FMS discriminatesbased on sex; it cannot satisfy
an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.
FMS 186.5 violates equal protection because it denies same sex
couples the rights and benefits of similarly situated opposite sex couples.
This Court has consistently found statutes materially impinging an
individual's rights unconstitutional. See, .&., Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,874 (1992)(finding
that states cannot place undue burden on women's decisions to terminate
pregnancies); Craig, 429 U.S. at 196-97 (holding that states cannot
materially impair the ability of males to purchase beer); Loving, 388
U.S. at 12 (holding that states cannot prohibit interracial marriages);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that
states cannot impair married couple's right to obtain or use
contraception). This Court has called marriage "essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free [people]." Loving 388 U.S. at 12. Here, to
deny Dr. Wallace the right to marry Ms.McGregor impinges on her right
to marry merely due to an accident of birth.
Denying same sex couples the right to marry discriminates
against them because similarly situated opposite sex couples are
permitted to marry. Discrimination against one sex that is similarly
situated to another violates equal protection. See Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75-77 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682
(1973). Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor are similarly situated to opposite
sex couples that wish to marry. Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor are
prohibited under FMS from marrying and opposite couples are not;
therefore, FMS violates equal protection.
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2. FMS violates equal protection ideals of fundamental
fairness and equality, which mandates that a higher
standard of review than rational basis be applied.
FMS is fundamentallyunfair because it denies same sex couples
the right to marry. The Equal Protection clause protects "any
individual" from denial of equal protection under the laws. U.S. Const.
Amend XIV. Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor deserve the same
opportunity for happiness as couples of the opposite sex.
The word "marriage" has religious connotations that contribute
to courts' and legislature's apprehension in accepting same sex marriage.
Society continuously struggles to separate its legal and political structure
from its religious origins. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2490 (1994) (holding that New
York law carving out separate school district based solely on religion
was impermissible "fusion" of governmental and religious functions;
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding invocations and
benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies to violate First
Amendment's Establishment Clause). The traditional religious
connotations of marriage must be kept separate from the legal
construction of our society today. A civil definition of marriage, such
as the following, would alleviate this apprehension. The social
institution under which ... [two people] establish their decision to join
in a special kind of social and legal dependence; any intimate or close
union. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1179 (2nd Ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
Reliance on history and tradition to prohibit same sex marriage
is problematic. Many historical traditions are now viewed as societal
blunders. For example, seventy-seven years ago, a woman could not
vote. U.S. Const. Amend XIX [1920]. Thirty-five years ago, blacks
could not rent rooms in certain motels or sit in certain restaurant dining
rooms. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Thomas
Jefferson said "women should be neither seen nor heard in society's
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decision making councils." See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 n. 13 (quoting
M. Gruberg, Women in American Politics 4 (1968)). At one time,
women in Salem, Massachusetts thought to be "witches" were burned at
the stake merely because they were different. Society must be reminded
of its past mistakes to avoid repeating them. People should not be
discriminated against because they are different. FMS is fundamentally
unfair because it deprives persons of the same sex the right to marry; it
relies on traditions which are changing.
Courts disagree whether prohibition of same sex marriage
"preserves traditional societal mores," (R. at 17) (citing Adams v.
Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1982)), or contradicts an
"evolving social order." Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993).
Although one court noted over twenty years ago that marriage is a
"protected legal institution between a man and a woman because of
societal values associated with propagation of the human race," that
same court also noted that "the public's attitude toward homosexuals is
undergoing a substantial, albeit gradual, change." Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1195-96 (Wash. 1974).
Reliance on Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191 (stating that the "operative
distinction lies in the relationship described by marriage itself, and not
in a distinction between the sexes"), to support the argument that equal
application of a statute does not violate equal protection, is misguided.
Equal application of FMS to males and females still discriminatesbased
on sex because it has an unequal impact. Notwithstanding FMS's equal
application to males and females, FMS still discriminates based on sex.
Therefore, FMS 186.5 treats similarly situated same sex couples
differently than opposite sex couples by depriving them of the right to
marry, which violates equal protection.
Petitioners were also discriminated against based on sexual
orientation. Sex discrimination can include a "prohibition based on
sexual orientation." Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745,
749 (4th Cir. 1996); see also McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Super., 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (reserving decision on same
sex sexual harassment); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428,
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430 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that same sex sexual harassment may be
actionable). Here, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor never alleged they
were homosexual. (R. at 3.) They called themselves a same sex couple
only as a "desperate attempt to obtain a [marriage] license," after the
clerk at the Froessel Department of Health denied their license. (R. at
3.) The clerk's denial was based on the assumption that they were
homosexual. (See R. at 3). The clerk stated "I can give marriage
licenses only to heterosexual couples." (R. at 3.) According to the
clerk's statement and the plain language of FMS, any two people, having
complied with all the statutory requirements, would be granted a
marriage license, regardless of their sexual orientation, as long as they
were not of the same sex.
The Thirteenth Circuit, not Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor,
placed the question of homosexuality at issue. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at
48 n.12 (stating that plaintiffs complaint did not allege they were
homosexuals; Director of Department of Health, by virtue of his motion
forjudgment on pleadings, placed question of homosexuality in issue).
Thus, Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor were discriminated against based
on sexual orientation.
Same sex marriage may serve to promote economic fairness.
This Court characterized marriage as "the most important relation in
life." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). It is economically
unfair that Ms. McGregor, in her years as a working taxpayer, has
accrued federal and state benefits which will not be received by her life
companion. (R. at 2.)
It is inconsistentwith Froessel's history to deny the right of same
sex marriage to its citizens. The city of Froessel held the Gay and
Lesbian Pride Parade, where Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor met close
to twenty years ago. (R. at 2.) Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor decided
to build their life in Froessel and never experienced any prejudice in
their respective work places or in the community. (R. at 2.) By
prohibiting same sex marriage, this Court discards the spirit of
fundamental fairness and equality that Froessel has historically
embraced. FMS 186.5 violates equal protection because it discriminates
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based on sex by restricting marriage to opposite sex couples.
B. FMS Fails To Satisfy Intermediate Scrutiny Because
It Does Not Prevent The Spread of STD's or Promote
Procreation; Therefore, It Is Not Substantially
Related To Froessel's Stated Governmental Goals.
FMS 186.5 cannot satisfy an intermediate standard of review.
To be constitutional under intermediate scrutiny, a statute must state
important governmental objectives and the classification of individuals
being discriminated against must be substantially related to achieving
those objectives. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Here, prohibiting persons
of the same sex to marry is not substantially related to either of
Froessers stated objectives of preventing sexually transmitted diseases
or promoting procreation. A rational basis review is improper because
Petitioners never alleged they were homosexual. Thus, FMS 186.5 is
unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy an intermediate scrutiny
analysis and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Preventing sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") is an
important governmental goal, but it is not served by prohibiting same
sex marriages. A statute with an important governmental interest cannot
survive an intermediate standard of review unless it is substantially
related to that interest. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Statistics must establish
that a distinction is substantially related to achievement of the stated
governmental goal. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200. Here, Froessel has
failed to provide any statistical evidence showing a correlation between
prohibiting same sex marriage and preventingthe spread of STDs among
homosexuals. The total percentage of "those affected with STDs in
Froessel is 3%," but the evidence fails to indicate what percentage of
this three percent constitute homosexuals. (R. at 9.) According to the
statistics provided, it is possible that more heterosexuals than
homosexuals in Froessel are afflicted with STDs.
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Contrary to Froessel's assertion, preventing same sex marriages
will not reduce the number of homosexuals afflicted with STD's in
Froessel. Presumably, no homosexual in Froessel afflicted with an STD
is married. (R. at 10.) Hence, prohibiting same sex marriage bears no
relation to preventing the spread of STDs among homosexuals.
Furthermore, sexual contact, not marriage, causes STDs. (R. at 10.)
Marriage has "no bearing on whether a couple of the same sex or
opposite sex, will engage in sexual relations" and if so, whether
monogamously or otherwise. (R. at 10.) FMS is not substantially
related to Froessel's asserted governmental objective of preventing the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases among homosexuals.
Promoting procreation is not furthered by FMS. This Court
stated that "procreation [is] fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding that sterilizing habitual criminals denied them of fundamental
right to procreate). However, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor cannot
procreate with one another; thus, denying them the right to marry is
unrelated to promoting procreation. Furthermore, marriage does not
promote procreation. Although "propagation of the human race is only
possible between a man and woman," marriage is not equivalent to
creating children. (R. at 20.) Unlike the situation here, Skinner
addressed the issue of denial of an individual's fundamental right to
procreate. Dr. Wallace and Ms.McGregor are not deprived of the
fundamental right to procreate, nor would their marriage deprive others
of the right to procreate. FMS bears no substantial relation to preventing
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases or promoting procreation.
Consequently, it fails to satisfy an intermediate scrutiny standard of
review.
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C. Alternatively, FMS 186.5 Cannot Survive a Rational
Basis Standard of Review Because It Is Not
Rationally Related To Preventing STDs or
Promoting Procreation.
Alternatively, FMS also fails to satisfy a rational basis analysis.
To be constitutional under this standard, a statute must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Cen., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Here, prohibiting
same sex marriage is not rationally related to preventing the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases or promoting procreation. Marriages do
not prevent the spread of STDs, as marriages do not regulate sexual
relations from which STDs can be spread. Moreover, marriages do not
imply procreation by all couples. Accordingly, prevention of same sex
marriages do not further these goals in any rational manner. Thus, FMS
is not rationally related to Froessel's stated goals of preventing the
spread of STDs among homosexuals or promoting procreation and
cannot survive a rational basis standard of review.
II. FROESSEL PENAL LAW STATUTES §§ 167.20 AND
514.71 ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS APPLIED
TO MS. MCGREGOR BECAUSE HER LIBERTY
INTEREST IN ASSISTANCE WITH HASTENING HER
DEATH OUTWEIGHS THE STATE OF FROESSEL'S
INTERESTS IN PRESERVING LIFE, PREVENTING
SUICIDE, AND AVOIDING INFLUENCE OF THIRD
PARTIES.
Froessel's statutes prohibiting assistance in hastening one's death
violate Ms. McGregor's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. To
succeed, a due process claim must show that a liberty interest is being
violated by the State. Violation is shown by demonstrating that the
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liberty interest in question is more important than the State's interest in
restricting it. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 279 (1990). The Federal District Court of Froessel correctly held
(1) that Ms. McGregor has a liberty interest in assistance with hastening
her death; (2) that as applied to her, Ms. McGregor's liberty interest
outweighs Froessel's asserted interests in preserving life, preventing
suicide, and avoiding influence of third parties; and (3) that, therefore,
Ms. McGregor's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
have been violated. (R. at 11.)
A. Ms. McGregor has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in obtaining assistance with hastening
her death.
Assistance in hastening one's death is a liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996).
Courts have variously found protected liberty interests by
finding historical and traditional roots for the right or by evaluating the
implicit nature of the right. Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1976) (the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
(fundamental liberties are those implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty). These courts share the opinion that the Constitution is not the
only source of liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; yet,
they are in disagreement over the appropriate source of
extra-Constitutional liberties.
While one could wish for an easy formula by which interests
could be adjudged to have constitutional protection or not, the simple
fact is that
[d]ue process has not been reduced to any formula; its
content cannot be determined by reference to any code.
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The best that can be said is that through the course of
this Court's decisions it has represented the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for
the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society.
CaseK, 505 U.S. at 850 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
Thus, rather than any strict code, the adjudication of substantive due
process claims rely upon the "reasonedjudgement" of the court. Casey,
505 U.S. at 849. This judgement should be applied to the "balance...
struck between... -liberty and the demands of organized society," rather
than the formulaic notions of history and tradition which have "frozen
due process of law at some fixed stage of time or thought." Id. at 850
(tRochinv. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952)). Therefore,
"[t]he proper analysis in determining a liberty interest is whether the
asserted interest is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, rather than
whether it is deeply rooted in our history or explicit in the constitution."
(R. at 11.)
There are many examples of this Court's reasoned judgement
which found protected interests implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
with no explicit basis in the constitution nor any foundation in history or
tradition. In Griswold, this Court found a protected liberty in marital
privacy, which prohibits a state from forbidding a married couple to use
contraceptives. 381 U.S. at 484. In Loving, this Court found a liberty
interest in the institution of marriage, which protected interracial
marriage from state interference. 388 U.S. at 17. In Roe v. Wade, this
court found a liberty interest in a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The right of a terminally ill person to have assistance in
hastening his own death is another interest implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. "[T]he most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Casey,
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505 U.S. at 851. And "few decisions are more personal, intimate, or
important than the decision to end one's life, especially when the reason
for doing so [as in the present case] is to avoid excessive and protracted
pain." Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281
("[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of
obvious and overwhelming finality"); (R. at 4).
It is a decision central to personal dignity and autonomy.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814 ("[a] competent terminally ill
adult, having lived nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty
interest in choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being
reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness,
diapered, sedated, incontinent"). In this instance, Ms. McGregor seeks
to die with dignity, quickly and painlessly. (R. at 5.) She should not be
denied that right.
Additionally, this decision to hasten one's death involves "the
right most valued by civilized men, namely, the right to be let alone."
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (i Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)); (R. at 12).
Furthermore, both the Supreme Court and the State of Froessel
have acknowledged that there is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in a competent person's refusal of unwanted medical treatment,
even if such refusal would lead inexorably to death. Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 278; FHM § 80.383. There is virtually no difference between these
constitutional lyprotected rights which have already been recognized and
the liberty interest involved in this case.
Ms. McGregor is a terminally ill patient suffering from
metastasizing lymphoma, who is in the final, painful stages of her
disease. (R. at 4.) She is competent to be able to make the choice to
hasten her death. (R. at 5) (she has a living will, and her friends, doctors,
lawyer, and relatives are not surprised at her desire to hasten her death).
Were Ms. McGregor on life sustaining medication or machinery, there
would be no legal problem with assistance with hastening her death.
Yet, simply because she is not connected to life saving equipment, that
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same aid is legally impermissible. There is no constitutionally
significant reason to make any distinction between these two
alternatives.
The traditional grounds of distinction state that "assisted suicide"
is different because it "(1) requires doctors to play an active role; (2)
causes deaths that would not result from the patient's underlying disease;
and (3) requires doctors to provide the causal agent of patients' deaths."
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822. However persuasive these
distinctive features might once have been, they are now groundless.
The commission verses omission distinction is blurred by the
fact that patients can currently request the termination of life sustaining
treatment and the removal of life sustaining equipment. "In
disconnecting a respirator, or authorizing its disconnection, a doctor is
unquestionably committing an act; he is taking an active role in bringing
about the patient's death." Id. In the present case, Ms. McGregor would
administer the lethal drug by her own hand. (R. at 5.) Dr. Wallace's
assistance would consist only in providing the prescription and
emotional support.
Likewise, "drawing a distinction on the basis of whether the
patient's death results from an underlying disease no longer has any
legitimacy." Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822. The Cruzan case is
most exemplary in this regard. Rather than being terminally ill, Ms.
Cruzan had a life expectancy of thirty years. Compassion in Dying, 79
F.3d at 822. However, both the Supreme Court and the Missouri courts
allowed "the medical profession to make Nancy die by starvation and
dehydration." Id. at 822 n.92 (c Cruzan By Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 412 (1988).
When a doctor provides a conscious patient with
medication to ease his discomfort while he starves
himself to death .. .the patient does not die of any
underlying ailment. To the contrary, the doctor is
helping the patient end his life by providing medication
that makes it possible for the patient to achieve suicide
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by starvation.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822-23.
Finally, the causation argument has no foundation given the state
of "current medical practices and current medical ethics.... As part of
the tradition of administering comfort care, doctors have been supplying
the causal agent of patients' deaths for decades." Id. at 823. Typically,
this occurs when a drug or treatment is administered, which, besides
alleviatingthe pain or halting the spread of the disease also hastens the
patient's death. Id. Often these "treatments" become the actual cause of
death, rather than the initial disease. Id. This may, in fact, happen in
this case if Ms. McGregor is not granted the right of assistance in
hastening her death because of Dr. Longshanks' promise to "do all he
can" to ease her pain. (R. at 4.)
There is, therefore, no constitutionally significant difference
between a physician "pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing
drugs which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his own life."
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824. That being the case, both the
Supreme Court and Froessel have necessarily recognized a liberty
interest in assistance with hastening one's own death by recognizing a
right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment. Compassion in Dying,
79 F.3d at 822-24. Ms. McGregor should not be denied that right.
B. Ms. McGregor's liberty interest in assistance with
hastening her death outweighs Froessel's interests.
Froessel's interests do not justify its statutes' prohibition of Ms.
McGregor's exercise of her liberty interest in assistance with hastening
her death. Whether a person's substantive due process rights have been
violated is determined by balancing the liberty interest against the
relevant state interests. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982);
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 812.'
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While Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), did not acknowledge
the existence of a balancing test as a means for determining whether an
important liberty interest has been violated, neither did it "purport to
overrule, or even hint at any desire to modify, the Court's
ninety-year-oldpractice of using a balancingtest in liberty interest cases
that raise important issues" of the type being considered here.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 804 ("Flores did not mention Cruzan,
Youngberg, Mills, Jacobsen, or any other balancing case").
Furthermore, even if the Court intended to restrict substantive due
process cases to strict scrutiny or rationality review, this case must be
analyzed under strict scrutiny because the liberty interest involved is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "central to personal
dignity and autonomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (fundamental rights
are those rooted in history and tradition or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty); Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26 (fundamental rights are those
which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty); Casey, 505 U.S. at
851 ("choices central to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Flores, 507 U.S. at
305 (strict scrutiny is required where fundamental rights are involved).
Since Froessel cannot overcome a balancing test, neither could it
overcome strict scrutiny. (R. at 13 n.19).
Moreover, both the trial court and the circuit court below
recognize a balancing test as the most appropriate test in this situation.
(R. at 13, 22). See also Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 799; Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 279; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321; Mills, 457 U.S. at 299;
Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905). Therefore, a
balancing test must be used to determine whether Ms. McGregor's
liberty interest is more important than the state's asserted interests in this
case.
Under this balancing test, Ms. McGregor's liberty interest in
assistance with hastening her death outweighs Froessel's interests in
preserving her life, preventing her suicide, and avoiding the influence of
third parties. Therefore, Froessel's statutes have violated Ms.
McGregor's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
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1. Preserving Life
Ms. McGregor's liberty interest outweighs the State's interest in
preserving her life. The state has a legitimate, unqualified interest in
preserving human life. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282; Compassion in Dying,
79 F.3d at 816. Yet this interest is not absolute and wanes even as the
individual's liberty interest in hastening their death increases.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 817. The state's interest in preserving
life is at its greatest when the individual is young and healthy. Id. at
834. Likewise, the state's interest in preserving life is at its weakest, as
in the present case, "when a mentally competent adult is terminally ill,
and wishes, free of any coercion, to hasten his death because his
remaining days are an unmitigated torture [and]... being forced to live
is indeed being subjected to pain and suffering that is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist on." Id. (c Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807)
(internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted); (R. at 4-5).
Froessel has recognized this fact by providing that a "competent
person has the right to elect in advance to reject artificial life support."
(R. at 14); FHM § 80.383. And the Supreme Court has said that this
right to reject artificial life support, including food and water, is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. Compassion in Dying, 79
F.3d at 816 (c Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287, 302, 343)). Therefore,
while Froessel has an interest in preserving life, that interest is not
absolute, nor is it strong enough to constitutionally prohibit Ms.
McGregor from hastening her death.
2. Preventing Suicide
Ms. McGregor's liberty interest outweighs the State's interest in
preventing her suicide. Closely related to Froessel's interest in
preserving life is its asserted interest in preventing suicide, and like the
interest in preserving life, the strength of Froessel's interest in preventing
suicide depends on the circumstances. In cases like the present one,
812 [Vol. XIII
BEST PETITIONER'S BRIEF
where a competent terminally ill person has chosen to hasten her death,
the State's interest is at its lowest, and is not strong enough to
constitutionally prohibit the exercise of that liberty interest.
Among the chief objections to allowing assistance with
hastening one's death is Froessel's concern with the "tragic and
distressing societal problem" of suicide, which is "the second leading
cause of death in young people" and is "committed by people who have
treatable mental disorders." (R. at 23.) In these cases, the State's
interest in preventing suicide is at its peak. Froessel certainly has the
right to prohibit these suicides, but it is unnecessary to extend this
prohibition to Ms. McGregor's case in order to protect these interests.
In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Ms. McGregor was not
of a sound mind when she made the decision to hasten her death. In
fact, all available evidence points the other way. (R. at 4-5.) Neither is
Ms. McGregor young or in the prime of life or health. (R. at 4.)
Froessel may place restrictionson assistance with hastening one's death
to adequately protect these legitimate state interests, but absolute
prohibition is an unconstitutional infringementon the liberty interests of
the competent terminally ill person. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at
832-33.
Furthermore, Froessel has no more interest in preventing suicide
than it does in preserving life generally. Certainly Froessel cannot claim
an absolute interest in preventing suicide. Since FHM § 80.383 gives
one the right to end one's life by refusing artificial life support, Froessel
must either relinquish its interest in preventing suicide, at least to some
extent, or it must somehow define suicide as not encompassing the acts
protected by FHM § 80.383. Since it has already been established that
the individual liberty interest involved in the present case is
constitutionally indistinguishable from the rights protected by FHM §
80.383, the right to assistance with hastening one's death is, therefore,
either outside the State's interest in preventing suicide or is not within
the state's definition of suicide at all. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at
824 ("[a] decision by a terminally ill patient to hasten by medical means
a death that is already in process, should not be classified as suicide");
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(R. at 14).
Finally, the medical profession's allegiance to the Hippocratic
Oath should not deter this Court from ruling in favor of assistance in
hastening one's death. Not only is the interpretation of the Hippocratic
Oath fickle, but it is of no constitutional value. When this Court was
considering Roe, the American Medical Association "contended that
performing abortions violated the Hippocratic Oath." Compassion in
D ying, 79 F.3d at 829. Surely, the Hippocratic Oath should have no
more impact in deciding the constitutionality of assistance in hastening
one's death than it did in determining whether a woman had a
constitutional right to have an abortion. Id. Therefore, the State's
interest in preventing suicide is not sufficientto prohibit Ms. McGregor
from obtaining assistance in hastening her death.
3. Avoiding Influence of Third Parties
Ms. McGregor's liberty interest outweighs the State's interest in
avoiding the influence of third parties. As with the State's interest in
preventing teen suicide, Froessel's legitimate interest in avoiding the
influence of third parties can be adequately protected by regulation
without interfering with Ms. McGregor's rights. (R. at 15.) There is a
genuine concern that influence of less than altruistic third parties would
result in truly undesired deaths. Compassion in Dying, 79 F3d..d at 825-
26. Whether it be guilt or concern for loved ones or the ambitions of a
greedy relative, the potential for abuse is real. However, there is no
evidence to suggest that there is any third party influence encouraging
Ms. McGregor to hasten her death. In fact, Ms. Wallace was dismayed
to hear of her partner's impending death and only agreed to assist her in
hastening it when she realized Ms. McGregor would proceed with or
without her. (R. at 4.) Additionally, three separate doctors confirmed
Ms. McGregor's prognosis. (R. at 4-5) (Dr. Longshanks, Dr. Bruce, and
Dr. Wallace). Thus, while there is adequate state interest to regulate
assistance in hastening one's death, there simply is no legitimate state
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interest strong enough to uphold absolute prohibition of it. Compassion
in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832-33. Neither does Froessel's interest in avoiding
the influence of third parties outweigh Ms. McGregor's liberty interest
in obtaining assistance in hastening her death.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit should be reversed.
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